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I. INTRODUCTION: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
Both teaching and research in criminal law often separate substantive
"criminal law" sharply from "criminal procedure." Many who write and teach
about "criminal law" would, I suspect, share the view with which Markus Dubber
begins his book on the Model Penal Code--"The criminal law ... comes down to
a single, basic, question: who is liable for what?"' They would assign to the
separate subject of "criminal procedure" the question of just how liability gets to
be assigned to those who are liable. Now there are of course benefits to be gained
from such a division of theoretical labor: there are different questions to be asked
about the content of the substantive criminal law (about its definitions of offenses
and defenses, about the conditions of criminal liability that it specifies), and about
the procedures by which the applications of those definitions and the satisfaction of
those conditions are determined. However, there are also losses to be incurred
from making this division too sharp, and benefits to be gained from thinking more
broadly about the criminal law as a single, practical enterprise of defining and
allocating criminal liability--especially if one is embarking, as I am, on the
ambitious project of critically analyzing "the principles of criminal liability."
If we separate substantive criminal law from criminal procedure, we will
suppose that those principles should determine "who is liable for what"--and that
this is indeed the "single, basic question" of criminal law. We might do better,
however, to change the question, and to ask instead "Who can be held liable for
what by whom?" We should be looking, that is, not for principles that will
determine who is in some abstract or impersonal sense liable for what, as if
criminal liability was a state or condition that we acquire purely by our own
efforts; but rather for principles that will help us determine when it is legitimate for
some person or body to hold someone liable, thus properly portraying criminal
liability as a process or activity, not merely as a condition or state.
This suggestion depends on a conception of the criminal trial as (in normative
aspiration, albeit admittedly not often in empirical fact) a process by which the
polity holds its citizens accountable: not just a process by which the truth of an
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accusation, or the defendant's penal fate, is determined, but a process through
which a defendant is called, as a citizen, to answer a charge of wrongdoing, and to
accept the judgment, and if proved guilty, the condemnation of her fellow
citizens.2 For the criminal law claims the authority not just to define conduct as
criminal, but to call citizens to account for such conduct: to require them to answer
the charge that they engaged in such conduct, and to judge, condemn, and punish
them for doing so. Our responsibilities or obligations as citizens under the law
include not just refraining from crime, but answering for our alleged crimes, and
accepting liability for our proved crimes.
Given such a conception of criminal liability as a process or an activity, the
principles of criminal liability should be the principles governing the activity of
holding people criminally liable; they must therefore concern not only what we can
call the direct conditions of criminal liability (i.e. the conditions determined by the
substantive criminal law), but also what we can call the conditions of
accountability, or the preconditions of liability. These are the conditions that must
first be satisfied before the question of whether the direct conditions of liability are
satisfied can be properly raised, let alone decided, in a criminal trial. The question
for the trial is whether this defendant should be convicted or acquitted of the
charge he has been called to answer. Before that question can even be properly
raised, however, we must ask whether the conditions of accountability are
satisfied, i.e. whether this court can properly call this person to answer this charge
of criminal wrongdoing, and judge his guilt or innocence: unless those conditions
are satisfied, the court cannot legitimately deal with the question of guilt.
3
Legal versions of some of these "conditions of accountability" figure amongst
what Paul Robinson classifies as "non-exculpatory defenses."4 Robinson himself
rightly notes "just how inappropriate it is to use this single term [defense] to refer
to so many different matters" 5-although I don't think that he follows through the
implications of that comment consistently enough or seriously enough: for whereas
"defenses" properly speaking constitute answers to a criminal charge, and justify
acquitting a defendant who was properly tried, most of the pleas that figure in this
category of "non-exculpatory defenses" serve rather to bar the defendant's trial.
Two examples will illustrate this general point.
First, a successful insanity defense, which is focused on the defendant's
condition at the time of the killing, justifies his acquittal: he answers this charge of
culpable wrongdoing by denying culpability. By contrast, a successful plea of
incompetency, or of unfitness to plead, which focuses on the defendant's condition
at the time of the trial, does not offer an answer to the charge of wrongdoing, but
shows instead that this defendant cannot be properly called to answer that charge,
2 See generally R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 99-145 (1986).
3 See R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 179-97 (2001).
4 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 55-57, 102-14, 179-87, 460-543 (1984).
5 Id. at 1.
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because he lacks the capacities necessary to understand it or to answer it: the claim
is not that he did not culpably commit the crime charged, or that the prosecution
cannot prove his guilt, but that he cannot be tried for it. 6
Second, someone might answer a charge by arguing that she was authorized
to engage in the conduct in question, conduct that would otherwise have been
criminal; for instance, under English law a parent could rebut a charge of assault
on her child by arguing that what she was doing constituted nothing more than
"lawful chastisement.",7 By contrast someone who claims diplomatic immunity
when charged with an offense is not claiming that she was authorized to engage in
that conduct, or that her conduct was legally permissible-indeed, she might admit
that what she did was culpably criminal: but she is denying that this court has the
authority to call her to account for her conduct.
In each of these cases, the defendant does not answer the accusation by
arguing that she is not guilty of the offense (or that the prosecution cannot prove
her guilt); she argues instead that it is not an accusation that she should have to
answer in this court. We must, therefore, distinguish "defenses," which constitute
answers to the charge (thus admitting that the charge is one that I can be required
to answer), from "bars to trial"-pleas that pre-empt prosecution by showing the
trial itself to be illegitimate.
II. BARS TO TRIAL-AN INITIAL TYPOLOGY
If "the principles of criminal liability" are understood, as I am suggesting they
should be, as principles governing the institutional activity of holding people
criminally liable, they must deal with the conditions of accountability-the
conditions that must be satisfied if a criminal trial, as a process through which a
citizen is called to account for his alleged wrongdoing, is to be legitimate; the non-
satisfaction of any of those conditions constitutes a bar to trial. We can make
progress in understanding those conditions (and in critically evaluating our
criminal processes) by developing a typology of bars to trial: by getting clearer
about the various kinds of factors that render trials illegitimate, and about why they
do so, we can get clearer about the conditions that a legitimate trial must satisfy.
What follows is an attempt at a preliminary, and so far very rough, typology.
We can identify four central types of bar to trial. The first focuses on the
condition of the defendant-on whether he is fit to be called to answer any charge.
The second focuses on the conduct that is alleged to constitute his crime--on
whether it is something he can be called to answer for. The third focuses on the
evidence against him-on whether there is a case that he must answer. The fourth
focuses on the authority or standing of those who call him to answer--on whether
6 2 ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 501-08 (commenting on incompetency); see also JOHN SPRACK,
EMMINS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 252-54 (9th ed. 2002) (commenting on English law).
7 See JOHN C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 424-25 (10th ed. 2002). This parental
right is now under attack in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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the polity, in whose name both the prosecutor and the court claim to act, has the
right to call this defendant to account. 8
A. The Defendant's Condition
A defendant who is to be legitimately called to answer a charge of
wrongdoing must be capable of answering it; otherwise his trial becomes a
travesty. A defendant who is incompetent or unfit to plead at the time of his trial,
i.e. one who is not capable of understanding and responding to the charge against
him, should not be tried: not because his guilt could not be proven, but because his
trial could not then be what it is supposed to be-a process through which he
answers the charge of wrongdoing.
B. The Alleged Conduct
A defendant who is fit to be tried can bar her trial by showing that the
prosecution has not alleged anything for which she can be tried or for which she
must answer. So she might show that the alleged offense was committed outside
the jurisdiction of this legal system, or so long ago that its prosecution is barred by
a statute of limitations; or that she has already been tried, and has already answered
for, this conduct, so that to try her now on this charge would constitute double
jeopardy; or that the conduct she is alleged to have engaged in does not constitute
an offense, so that even if the prosecution proved every fact it alleged, it would not
prove her to be guilty of an offense.9
C. The Prosecution 's Case
A defendant can be legitimately required to answer a charge only when there
is sufficient evidence to constitute a case to answer: citizens should not be required
to subject themselves to the burden of a trial unless the prosecution can adduce
credible evidence of their guilt. This is a key function of various kinds of pre-trial
hearings-of preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings under American
law, for instance, which must decide whether there is "probable cause to believe"
that the defendant committed the offense charged; and of committal proceedings
8 1 will not consider here the various rules about the exclusion of evidence: although such
exclusions can constitute de facto bars to trial when they exclude evidence that was vital to the
prosecution's case, and although the grounds of exclusion can overlap interestingly with grounds for
barring the trial when they involve serious misconduct by the police or the prosecution, the exclusion
even of vital prosecution evidence is not formally a bar to trial, and does not render the trial itself
illegitimate.
9 This is the (very infrequently used) plea of "demurrer" in English law. See CELIA HAMPTON,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 188 (3d ed. 1982). Such pleas have been more frequent in Scottish courts, in
light of the High Court's supposed "declaratory power" to create new crimes. See 1 GERALD H.
GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 15-40 (3d ed. 2000).
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under English law, which must decide whether the prosecution has made out at
least a prima facie case for the defendant to answer.'
0
D. The Polity's Standing
Finally, even if the prosecution could adduce legitimately acquired evidence
sufficient to prove that a competent defendant committed the crime charged, the
defendant might secure a bar to trial by arguing that the polity in whose name both
prosecutor and court must claim to act lacks the authority or the right to call her to
account in this way. She might, for instance, be able to claim diplomatic
immunity, which is understood as immunity from prosecution." Or she might be
able to argue that the prosecution's or the state's prior conduct towards her makes
it improper for her to be tried on this charge: perhaps she was promised immunity
in relation to this charge, as part of a plea bargain, or to avoid Fifth Amendment
obstacles to her testifying against others; 12 or perhaps she can argue that some type
of outrageous misconduct by the police or prosecution undermines the legitimacy
of her trial. I will return to this kind of case in section III.
There is of course much more to be said about the procedures by which such
pleas in bar of trial should be decided. They should, in principle, be dealt with
before the trial itself, since they concern the legitimacy of the criminal trial, as a
process in which a polity (which figures in American cases variously as the state,
the people, or the commonwealth) calls a defendant to answer a charge of
wrongdoing. 13 (In England defendants are accused and called to answer by the
sovereign, and in Scotland by "Her Majesty's Advocate"; that is because we are
still in the law's eyes subjects, not fully citizens.) This is not to say, however, that
such pleas should be decided by a judge rather than by a jury; and it leaves open a
range of important questions about who should bear the evidential or probative
burdens, and about the appropriate standard of proof. I cannot tackle such
questions here, nor can I discuss the equally important question of what the effect
10 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 714-19, 737-45 (3d ed. 2000)
(commenting on American law); see also SPRACK, supra note 6, at 188-89 (commenting on English
law).
1 See SPRACK, supra note 6, at 73.
12 See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 10, at 453-59, 973-80. However, the issue in relation to
plea bargaining more usually concerns the sentence to be sought for the offense to which the
defendant agreed to plead guilty; prosecutors do not typically try to pursue charges that they agreed
to drop.
13 The distinction between issues that should be decided before the trial, and those that are
properly dealt with as part of the trial, is obviously not always clear-cut; for instance, the defense can
ask for a finding that there is no case to answer during the trial, at the end of the prosecution's
presentation of its case. See SPRACK, supra note 6, at 293-95 (commenting on English law); LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 10, at 1128-29 (commenting on American law). There is still, however, a
significant difference between a pre-trial claim that there is not enough evidence even to warrant a
trial, and a claim during the trial that the prosecution, having been given the chance to make out its
case, has utterly failed to do so.
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of a successful plea in bar of trial should be-though I do not suppose that there is
one answer to this question; different pleas leave different avenues open.
We should, however, be cautious of Robinson's suggestion that, when a "non-
exculpatory defense" succeeds, courts should still be able to impose some of the
"collateral consequences" of conviction on the defendant-if necessary (when
there has been no trial) after a process of "culpability determination" that results in
a special verdict of "guilty but not punishable." Thus the court might order
preventive or protective detention for someone found unfit to plead, or order that
this offense should figure in the defendant's criminal record, even though he could
not be formally convicted for it.' 4 This suggestion reflects his view that these
"defenses" are to be justified in consequentialist terms, as a matter of balancing
"societal interests"; even if those interests are not served by holding a proper trial,
they might be served by subjecting the (guilty) defendant to at least some of the
consequences that could attach to conviction. But he does not take seriously
enough the ways in which a trial might be barred as a matter of justice (of the
polity's right to call this person to answer or to judge her), not of utility, and the
extent to which the justification of such "collateral consequences" can depend not
simply on the fact that the defendant was guilty, but on the fact that she is found
guilty by a legitimate criminal trial. There might be another, non-criminal process
to which a defendant who cannot be tried can properly be subjected, or another
body that can call her to account: someone found unfit to plead can be subjected to
the non-criminal process of civil psychiatric detention; someone who cannot be
called to account by this court or by this criminal law might be answerable to some
other institution or body. But if a trial is barred, no disposal whose justification
depends on such a criminal process can be justified.
III. ESTOPPEL AS A BAR TO TRIAL
The various trial-barring pleas can illuminate the nature and purposes of the
criminal trial: by asking whether and why they are justified, we can get clearer
about what a trial is supposed to be, what ends it should serve, and what values
should inform it. So by understanding why fitness to plead matters, for instance,
and what makes a person fit or unfit, we can get clear about the way in which the
criminal trial is meant to be a procedure through which a responsible citizen is
called to answer a charge of wrongdoing (and we can also recognize more sharply
the ways in which our own practice of criminal trials is a travesty). To illustrate
this general point, and the fruitfulness of the approach I am suggesting, I will look
in a little more detail at just one kind of trial-barring plea, which claims that the
polity's prior conduct towards the defendant undercuts its standing to try him. (It
is in this context that we might talk of "estoppel.")
Estoppel finds its more natural home in the civil law, rather than in the
criminal law, as a doctrine, or set of doctrines, which fills some of the gaps left by
14 See 1 ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 179-87.
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the law of contracts. It is "a mechanism for enforcing consistency; when I have
said or done something that leads you to believe in a particular state of affairs, I
may be obliged to stand by what I have said or done, even though I am not
contractually bound to do so."'5
In its strict or narrow sense, estoppel prevents a party who has induced or
allowed another to rely, to her potential detriment, on some explicit or implicit
assurance or commitment, from going back on that assurance or commitment to
the other's detriment. For example, if I promise my tenant that I will accept just
part of the rent she owes me for a given year, rather than demanding the full rent,
and the tenant relies on that promise, the doctrine of promissory estoppel precludes
me from going back on that promise, and suing for the full rent, even if the
promise was not legally binding as a matter of contract. 16 The tenant still owes the
rent, since a promise not to enforce a debt does not cancel the debt; but I am
estopped from demanding it. 17 However, we could see behind this narrow doctrine
a broader moral idea: that one's prior conduct towards another person can undercut
one's right to make what would otherwise have been a legitimate demand on them,
or to enforce duties that are nonetheless still binding on them. For instance, if I
constantly (and unrepentantly) lie to you, I cannot complain when you lie to me:
this need not be because my lying to you justifies or excuses your lie to me-we
could think that duties of honesty are not thus conditional on reciprocity, and insist
that we have the standing to condemn you; the point is, rather, that my own prior
dishonest behavior towards you morally estops me from complaining about your
dishonest conduct towards me. So too, if I set out to provoke you into attacking
me, we might say that your attack is neither justified nor excused, but that I can
hardly complain about it: my provocation does not legitimize your attack, but it
estops me from complaining about it.
The notion of estoppel is sometimes also applied in criminal law, to cases in
which what bars trial is the prior conduct of the prosecution or some other official
towards the defendant. Here are four examples of what might be counted as
criminal estoppel.
A. Promises of Immunity
The prosecutor promises the defendant immunity in relation to a particular
charge, as part of a plea bargain or to remove Fifth Amendment barriers to his
giving evidence. She is bound by her promise, at least or especially if the
defendant relied on it to his potential detriment, by pleading guilty on the agreed
charge, or by giving self-incriminating evidence; she is, we can say, estopped from
15 ELIZABETH COOKE, THE MODERN LAW OF ESTOPPEL 1 (2000).
16 See Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., 1947 K. B. 130.
17 This is, I should admit, a radically oversimplified statement of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. For a very clear statement of some of the complications, see PAUL RICHARDS, LAW OF
CONTRACT 65-70 (5th ed. 2002).
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breaking it. The defendant might be guilty; indeed, it might be possible to prove
his guilt by admissible evidence: but the prosecutor must keep her word, and the
polity in whose name she speaks must keep its word. We could of course find
pragmatic reasons for holding the prosecutor to such promises: if defendants could
not be confident that they would be kept, they would cease to be effective.
However, the basic reason is one of justice: a polity should not break its word to its
citizens.
B. Entrapment
Despite all the controversy that still surrounds the "defense" of entrapment, it
seems clear that it cannot be a defense which exculpates the defendant by showing
either that his conduct was justified or that he was non-culpable or less culpable.
The police officers who entrap him do not thereby authorize or legitimate his
commission of the offense, whilst the mere fact that they are, unknown to him,
police officers cannot render him less culpable than he would have been had the
inducers been, as he thought, private citizens (in which case he would not have
been able to plead entrapment). The facts that constituted the entrapment might
also establish a defense, for instance if the inducement amounted to duress; but the
entrapment per se does not look like a defense. Nor is it enough to say that
entrapment should bar conviction because this is an effective way of deterring
police misconduct: for-apart from the fact that there are better ways of achieving
that-this does not explain why the trial and conviction of someone who was
entrapped should seem intrinsically improper, as it does and should seem. The
point is rather that the hypocrisy and moral inconsistency involved in a polity
prosecuting someone for a crime that its officials induced, in order to be able to
prosecute this person, renders the trial illegitimate. "You urged me to do it" does
not exculpate me, but it does undermine your standing to condemn me for doing it.
That is why it is appropriate to talk of "estoppel" in such cases,18 and why
entrapment should be a bar to trial rather than a defense at trial.19
The previous paragraph admittedly plays fast and loose with some complex
and difficult issues about entrapment, including the questions of what should count
as entrapment and of what relevance, if any, the defendant's predisposition to
commit such crimes should have to his plea of entrapment (though my remarks
imply that it should have no relevance); it adopts what has been called the
"objective" approach favored by the minority on the Supreme Court in Sorrels,
Sherman and Russell,20 focusing on the conduct of the entrappers, rather than the
18 See, e.g., 1 ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 112; Andrew Ashworth, Testing Fidelity to Legal
Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE
GENERAL PART 299, 310-22 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 2002).
19 See Ashworth, supra note 18, at 321; see also R. v. Looseley 2001 U.K.H.L. 53.
20 Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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subjective approach that focuses on the conduct, intentions and predisposition of
the person who is entrapped: but much more argument is needed to show why that
is the right approach. All I have tried to do here is to show that, if we take
seriously the idea that an agent's prior conduct can undermine her right or her
standing to call another to account for his admittedly culpably wrongful conduct,
we can plausibly see entrapment as a bar to trial that is based on the same moral
idea.
There is another possible way of understanding the implications of
entrapment, which is perhaps hinted at in the majority view in Sorrels that conduct
which is induced in a way that constitutes entrapment "lies outside the purview" of
21the relevant criminal statute. If someone is entrapped into supplying an illegal
drug to a police undercover agent, for instance, he is no less culpable than someone
who supplied the drug to a genuine purchaser, but we might take a different view
of the objective wrongfulness of his action: if the whole interaction was part of a
carefully controlled police operation, it did not seriously threaten or make more
likely the kind of mischief at which the drug laws are aimed. From this
perspective, cases of entrapment-at least when they involve no victim and no
harm-are rather like impossible attempts to handle stolen goods when the goods
are not actually stolen, but are part of a "sting" operation by the police, and we
might be tempted to say that, culpable though the defendant might have been, he
did not commit a genuinely criminal wrong.22 However, this is yet another issue
that I cannot pursue here.
C. Discriminatory or Vindictive Prosecution
A defendant might argue, as a bar to trial, that even if she was provably guilty
as charged, the decision to prosecute her was grounded in a vindictive motive,23 or
that her selection for prosecution, from among the many who could have been
prosecuted, was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification., 24 Here again the point is not that the
21 Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 448, 451.
22 See People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906) and, more complicatedly, Haughton v. Smith,
A.C. 476 (1975); see also R. A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 101-06, 207-11 (1996).
23 See, e.g., Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 10, at 686-88.
24 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 10, at 679-86.
Such claims are of course notoriously hard to prove, given what the Supreme Court has declared must
be established (it is a further question whether such a burden of proof is fair); sometimes the alleged
discrimination infects not the decision to prosecute, but prior official decisions-for instance about
which applications for licenses to approve (see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)), or about
which cars to stop for traffic violations, with a view to searching them for drugs (see New Jersey v.
Soto 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996)); sometimes the remedy sought is not a direct bar
to trial, but the exclusion of the evidence improperly obtained (Id.). But my interest here is in the
point of principle that is raised most directly by the simple case of discriminatory decisions to
prosecute.
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defendant is not or might not be guilty, or that she could not be called to account
for her alleged wrongdoing by someone, but that the manner or motivation of her
prosecution renders it illegitimate. She is not being prosecuted to serve the proper
aims of justice; the injustice of the prosecutor's treatment of her undermines the
right of the polity (for whom the prosecutor is acting) to call her to account-at
least on this occasion. "You're picking on me unfairly" does not exculpate me, but
it does (if true) undermine your standing to demand that I answer to you.
(One might think that an even more egregious kind of official misconduct,
which should bar the trial as an abuse of process, is found when the defendant is
brought to trial by being kidnapped from abroad by or at the instigation of
government agents: but whereas in England the House of Lords has held that this
should indeed bar trial, in America the Supreme Court has refused to do so-
although the argument in the case was focused on the issue of whether the
kidnapping violated the extradition treaty between the United States and the
country from which the defendant was kidnapped.25)
D. Reliance on Official Advice about the Law
An agent's reasonable reliance on mistaken official advice that his
contemplated course of action was not criminal is sometimes said to ground a plea
of "entrapment by estoppel"-and given the unwarranted persistence of the
doctrine that even reasonable mistake of law is not a defense, one can see why
some such provision is necessary. If, however, we abandoned that doctrine, as we
should, we could distinguish two kinds of cases of reasonable reliance. In one, the
official who gives the advice acts in good faith, without malice; in the other she
acts in bad faith, intending to induce the commission of the crime. In the former
case, reasonable reliance should constitute a defense: the defendant's culpability is
negated by the fact that he made reasonable efforts to conform his conduct to the
law's demands; this should not be seen as a matter of estoppel. In the latter case,
we should still talk of estoppel, since it involves one kind of entrapment: the fact
the official, acting in the polity's name, induced the commission of the crime, by
deliberately misinforming the defendant, undermines the polity's standing to call
him to account for his crime.26
We should notice two features of all these cases: both are important, and the
second points to a serious problem about estoppel in the criminal context. First,
provisions such as these depend on a conception of what a polity owes its citizens,
and of what counts as fair dealing between polity and citizens, in the context of the
investigation and prosecution of crimes (and a conception of the implications of
the polity's failure to deal fairly and honestly). Aspects of that conception are of
25 See R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett, [1994] 1 A.C. 42; United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
26 See generally John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1997); Ashworth, supra note 18, at 302-10.
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course controversial: for instance, what kinds of inducement or encouragement of
crime count as legitimate police tactics, and which constitute illegitimate
entrapment; what other kinds of deception can the police properly use and what
kinds are illegitimate; what constitutes an improperly discriminatory prosecution,
given that prosecutors must retain a wide discretion about whom they prosecute?
However, what is not controversial is that there are some limits (moral limits,
which should also be legal limits) on police and prosecutorial tactics; that if those
limits are flouted the legitimacy of the trial is undermined; and that those limits
apply to the treatment of the guilty as well as to that of the innocent. Promises
made to guilty defendants are still binding, and their discriminatory or vindictive
prosecution is still improper: which is to say that they must still be seen as citizens
to whom the polity owes civic respect and justice.27 This point might seem too
obvious to be worth stating: but the ease with which criminals (at least those who
commit certain kinds of crime, crimes that "we" do not commit) are portrayed in
rhetoric and practice as the enemy against whom "we" must protect ourselves
makes it well worth emphasizing. To call someone to account or to answer for her
wrongdoing is to address her as a member of the polity whose essential values (as
expressed in the criminal law) she is accused of violating; it is to treat her as a
fellow citizen. But we must then ask more carefully what else is demanded by
such a recognition of citizenship: what tactics may the state or its officials use in
detecting and prosecuting crime; what kinds of misconduct by the state or its
officials would undermine its standing to prosecute, judge, condemn and punish an
offender? I will discuss a disturbing expansion of this question in section IV.
Second, the notion of estoppel in the criminal context presupposes a strong
conception of the unity of a polity and its officials. A prosecutor promises
immunity to a defendant, and that promise binds the polity. This might not disturb
us if the prosecutor acts within the legitimate bounds of her authority: since she is
authorized to make such a promise on behalf, and in the name, of the polity, of
course it is binding on the polity. The other grounds of estoppel might be more
worrying, however, since they involve misconduct by officials. If two police
officers entrap a criminal, their standing to pursue him is undermined, and if an
individual prosecutor mounts a vindictive prosecution, her standing to pursue it is
undermined: but why should this bar others, whose individual hands are clean,
from taking up the prosecution? The argument against prosecuting those who have
been entrapped is often put in terms of the impropriety of the state, or the polity,
prosecuting crimes that it induced: but is it clear that the misconduct of an official
should be thus ascribed to the polity? These bars to prosecution do, admittedly,
depend on the fact that the official was misperforming her official duties, rather
27 The doctrine that someone who has a "predisposition" to commit the kind of crime that he is
induced to commit cannot plead entrapment seems to be inconsistent with this view: in dealing with a
dispositionally "guilty" citizen, the police may use tactics that they should not use on dispositionally
"innocent" defendants. But that is what is objectionable about that doctrine. See United States v.
Russell, 411 U. S. 423, 443-44 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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than acting wholly outside them (if a police officer induces a drug deal for his own
private profit, that is not entrapment): but why should it not be possible to disown
those individuals' misconduct, and still prosecute the offender?
It might seem that the problem I am trying to raise here is not a real one.
Surely the most that we could expect is that the prosecution could go ahead
without relying on the officials' misconduct or on its fruits (as happens when
improperly obtained evidence is excluded, and the prosecution cannot make use of
the fruit of the poisoned tree). But in cases of entrapment, there would have been
no crime without the officials' misconduct; and in cases of vindictive or
discriminatory prosecution the assumption is presumably that properly motivated
officials would not have seen good reason to prosecute this defendant. The reason
why prosecution is barred is therefore not merely that there was this serious
misconduct by officials, but also that without that misconduct there would have
been either nothing to prosecute or no good reason to prosecute. (To which we
might add that in entrapment cases there is also the suspicion that the officials'
misconduct was not so sharply distinguishable from official misconduct: that the
entrapment was, if not officially sanctioned, still too close for comfort to officially
sanctioned tactics.)
This response has obvious force, at least when (as is typically true in
entrapment cases) there is no victim who has suffered wrongful harm. But suppose
there was a victim: imagine that police officers entrap a burglar into committing a
burglary so that they can catch him red-handed, without the consent or cooperation
of the victim. (I do not know how fanciful this is.) Now in civil law contexts, the
party who is estopped is the one who would otherwise benefit, for instance from
breaking a prior promise: estoppel simply prevents him profiting from his own
wrongdoing. If we could see crimes simply as wrongs against the state, we could
say the same thing in criminal contexts: a polity should not be allowed to benefit
(by convicting and punishing this defendant) from its own wrongdoing (and the
victim of the burglary could still bring a civil suit for damages against both the
burglar and those who entrapped him). But this is an inadequate conception of
crime, because it ignores the victim's wrong; a civil suit would deal with the harm,
but not with the wrong. The criminal law defines certain kinds of conduct as
public rather than merely private wrongs, but this is not to identify them as, qua
crimes, wrongs against the public rather than against their individual victims. It is
rather to identify them as wrongs in which we should all share, as the victim's
fellow citizens: we should see the wrong that was done to him as one that was also
done to us collectively, in virtue of our identification with him as a fellow citizen,
and with those values that the crime violated; we will then also see it as a wrong
that we should collectively vindicate on his, and our, behalf, by seeking to call the
wrongdoer to account for it.
We owe it to the victim of what is properly defined as a crime to recognize
and vindicate the wrong he has suffered by calling the wrongdoer to account, i.e.
by prosecuting him. If we then allow the prosecution to be estopped by the
officials' misconduct, it appears that we are not merely (and properly) denying the
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polity the profits of its officials' misconduct, but also (and improperly) denying the
victim the vindication that is her due. Nor would it be enough to prosecute the
officials for their misconduct, or to assist the victim in a civil suit; this would not
sufficiently address the wrong she has suffered at the hands of the direct
offender.28
IV. REFINING AND EXTENDING ESTOPPEL
The problem that I raised at the end of section III might be resolved by
refining the role of estoppel in criminal contexts. First, when what bars trial is the
legitimate, authorized conduct of an official carrying out her duties, as with a
legitimate grant of immunity, the victim (when there is one) has not been
unjustifiably denied his due. He might still secure vindication, if the defendant
who receives immunity still pleads guilty to a wrong against the victim, or gives
evidence that helps secure the conviction of others who were more centrally
involved in the wrong. In harder cases, the victim might indeed receive no direct
vindication-as when the defendant bargains a plea of guilty only to crimes against
other victims, or gives evidence only against the perpetrators of crimes against
other victims. But in such cases this victim's claims are weighed against those of
other victims, and we must surely accept that some such weighing (and
outweighing) can be justified. Furthermore, as a citizen this victim shares in the
vindication that the polity as a whole gains from the conviction of the guilty.
Second, when what prima facie bars trial is the misconduct of an official, the
trial should normally be barred if there would have been nothing, or no good
reason, to prosecute absent the misconduct. But if there is a victim with a claim to
vindication that would be unjustifiably frustrated if there was no prosecution, the
trial should not be barred; the official's misconduct should instead be formally
disavowed, and the official should be prosecuted along with the direct perpetrator.
Such a solution might be viable, so long as it is possible for the polity, for
those in whose name the polity and its officials supposedly act, to disown the
official's misconduct, and thus to pursue the prosecution with clean hands when a
prosecution is required: so long, that is, as there is a "we" who can collectively say
that our hands are clean in the relevant respects. But if we think in broader terms
about just how clean the hands must be of those who would call offenders to
account, claiming the right to judge and punish them; if we think about the kinds
of misconduct towards offenders that might undermine the legitimacy of the trial,
we will see that there is a deeper problem here, concerning the implications of
misconduct that we cannot so easily disown.
Consider, in this light, the persistently vexed problem of whether penal justice
28 The previous two paragraphs clearly presuppose a particular conception of crime, and of what
is due to the victims of crime. See S. E. Marshall & R. A. Duff, Criminalization and Sharing
Wrongs, 11 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1998); R. A. Duff, Restoration and Retribution, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 82 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).
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is possible in contexts of serious political and social injustice. We feel (we should
feel) uneasy when we realize how many of those who are convicted and sentenced
in our courts, receiving what are supposed to be their just deserts, have themselves
been the victims of persisting and systemic injustice at the hands of the polity of
which they are supposedly citizens (and so at our hands as their fellow citizens).
That unease sometimes motivates suggestions that serious (unjust) social
disadvantage should be recognized as providing either a partial or a complete
defense: perhaps an excuse of "duress of circumstances," for instance, or of lack of
fair opportunity to gain ordinarily available goods by non-criminal means; or even
a (partial) justification, if the crime can be seen as a response to, or as an attempt to
remedy, the injustice.29 But they might be more plausibly understood as grounding
moral, justice-based bars to trial, when offenders' disadvantage can be attributed to
serious, persisting, and systemic injustice at the hands of the polity. If we fail to
treat a person or group with the minimal respect or concern due to them as citizens,
we might lose the moral standing to call them to account, to judge them or
condemn them, for the wrongs that they commit as citizens.
One way to see the point here is to imagine ourselves as jurors and ask
ourselves whether we could honestly look this person, or a member of this
disadvantaged group, in the eyes and condemn him for his crime. 30 What we have
to ask ourselves in that imagined situation is not merely whether the evidence we
have heard suffices to prove his guilt, but whether we, as the jurors who are
supposed to judge this defendant as our fellow citizen, have the right or moral
standing to do so; and the answer to that question depends partly on whether we, as
members of the polity of which we and he are supposedly fellow citizens, have
treated him as a citizen.
Suppose, however, we come to think that we lack the moral standing to call a
defendant to account in this way for her wrongdoing-that, having collectively
failed to accord her the respect and concern due to her as a fellow citizen, we
cannot in all honesty now judge her as a fellow citizen. Where then, in the case of
victimizing crimes, does this leave the victim: in particular, where does it leave
victims who have not been complicit in those serious injustices that undercut the
legitimacy of the offender's prosecution, and who might indeed themselves be
victims of them (as is true of all too many victims of crime)? It seems that they are
owed vindication by the criminal law, but that the law, the polity's legal
institutions, cannot provide that vindication, since it lacks (we lack) the moral
standing to call those who wronged them to account.
29 See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385
(1976); Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985); Barbara A. Hudson,
Beyond Proportionate Punishment: Difficult Cases and the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, 22 CRIME, L.
& SOC. CHANGE 59 (1995). For a useful general, and critical, set of discussions, see FROM SOCIAL
JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000).
30 Cf Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2381 (1999).
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I suspect that that might be precisely the moral position we are in, the moral
dilemma that we face, in relation to all too many of those who appear in our
criminal courts. If that is right, we cannot hope to do adequate penal justice, penal
justice to both victims and offenders, until we come closer to achieving political
and social justice. Meanwhile, and in a properly humble and cautious spirit which
recognizes how far from clean our collective hands and consciences are in this
context, we must seek to develop more nuanced and complex legal procedures that
could at least recognize, even if they cannot do adequate justice to, the claims and
complaints of both victims and offenders. Some aspects of restorative justice
might help us here, in the attempt to restore, or to (re)create, those civic
relationships that are damaged both by social injustice and by crime-though we
must resist the idea, which is prevalent among advocates and critics of restorative
justice alike, that restorative justice cannot include punitive justice; but that is a
topic for another day.3'
31 See DUFF, supra note 3, at 197-201; Duff, supra note 28.
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